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Abstract
We evaluate the effects of restricted land use rights on aggregate productivity using micro-level data
within a quantitative model. In particular, we exploit the Rice Land Designation Policy in Vietnam,
which forces farmers to produce rice on almost 45% of plots of land. The policy provides a natural
setting for investigating the aggregate effects of land use misallocation. We quantify the impacts of
this system by formulating a two-sector model featuring production and occupation choices. We
also use digitized versions of Vietnam’s Local Land Use Atlas and Global Agro-Ecological Zones
database to construct a micro-spatial dataset that shapes important features of the model and
allows us to compare the restricted against a counterfactual efficient allocation. The main findings
suggest that eliminating all land use restrictions leads to 10.6% gain in agricultural total factor
productivity and 4.36% increase in real GDP per capita. While misallocation in agriculture has
been studied extensively, our research highlights a novel source of misallocation that is prevalent in
other countries such as China, Myanmar, Uzbekistan, among others.
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1 Introduction
Labor productivity gaps are much more significant in the agricultural sector than in the non-
agricultural ones (Caselli, 2005; Restuccia et al., 2008). Despite such substantial differences,
less-developed countries tend to have a majority of their labor share employed in agriculture.
Seeking a deeper understanding of the sources of this inefficient resource allocation is necessary
if one has to explain the persistence of large productivity gaps. In many prior studies, land
rights have been shown to have significant impacts on economic development.1 However,
much of focus has been placed on land transfer rights (sell, rent, bequeath, mortgage), and
little attention has been given to land use rights. Focusing on the latter under-explored
area of research, this paper illustrates the quantitative effects of land use restrictions on
productivity and resource allocation.
In particular, we study the impacts of Rice Land Designation Policy of Vietnam (RLDP).2
Vietnam requires that 3.8 million hectares, i.e. 39% of its agricultural land, to be devoted
to rice production by 2020 (Resolution 17/2011/QH13). This centralized land use planning
system is referred to as Rice Land Designation Policy. This policy plays a significant role in
supporting the National Food Security program whose objective is to ensure the national
food supply sources.
In this paper, we investigate the extent to which the practice of RLDP to stimulate rice
production can generate distortions in both land use and labor allocation, thus, lowering
productivity at both the sectoral (agriculture) and aggregate level. To quantify the dis-
tortionary effects of RLDP, we develop a two-sector model with three final goods. Two of
the three final goods are produced in the agricultural sector: rice and non-rice crops (other
agricultural commodities). The third final good is produced in the non-agricultural sector
by a representative firm. Individuals with heterogeneous ability can choose to be farmers or
workers. In agriculture, a production unit is a farm. Each farmer maximizes profit by choosing
which crop to produce and how much quality-adjusted land to rent. In non-agriculture,
the representative firm requires only effective labor as an input. Regarding RLDP, plots
of agricultural land can be restricted in land use. The restricted plots must be devoted to
1 Examples include Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014a), Adamopoulos et al. (2017), Chen (2017), Gottlieb
and Grobovsek (2015).
2 The term Rice Land Designation Policy is first used in Giesecke et al. (2013). In Vietnamese, this land
policy is known as ‘Dat Chuyen Trong Lua’, which is translated to Specialized Land for Rice Production.
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rice production only. In the model, we take land use restrictions as exogenously given. To
quantify the effects of the restrictions, we exploit both household level surveys (Vietnam
Access to Resources Household Survey) and spatial datasets (Local Land Use Atlas and Global
Agro-Ecological Zones) to account for heterogeneity in labor and land characteristics. Our
primary results concern the effects of entirely removing RLDP on agricultural productivity,
economy-wide productivity, and resource reallocation. To do so, we compare the current
economy of Vietnam to a hypothetical economy where RLDP does not exist.
Our approach to quantifying the misallocation effects of RLDP on productivity and resource
allocation builds upon the recent macro-development literature which studies the impact of
micro-level distortions on aggregate outcomes. However, we differ from other studies in two
main aspects. First, we consider a specific type of distortionary policy (land use restrictions)
in a particular context (Vietnam). Second, our model is constructed in a way that allows us
to incorporate spatial characteristics of land, which is essential to agricultural production.
Our main findings suggest that eliminating all restrictions coming from RLDP leads to
10.6% increase in the agricultural TFP. This improvement is highlighted by 16.4% gain in
agricultural labor productivity, 4.36% increase in real GDP per capita, 13.4% reduction in
agricultural employment, and 15.5% increase in average farm size.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of land reforms in
Vietnam, background information on RLDP, and a brief discussion of related literature.
Section 3 outlines the model that we use in our quantitative analysis. In Section 4, we define
an equilibrium of the model and discuss mechanisms of resource reallocation. Section 5
provides steps to connect the model and data. Section 6 presents our main results along with
a series of robustness checks and extensions. Then, Section 7 concludes our paper.
2 Background and Literature Review
We are interested in RLDP of Vietnam to illustrate the effects of land use restrictions
for several reasons. First, as rice remains the country’s primary staple food and export
commodity, its production involves approximately two-thirds of rural households, leading to
wide-spread impacts of adjustments in rice-related policies (Ha et al., 2015). Second, income
from rice production is too low leading to the phenomenon of abandoned rice fields across rural
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areas.3 Hence, policies promoting the conversion of low-yielding rice fields into land growing
high-value cash crops are necessary. Third, the early gains from market-oriented reforms
have diminished over time highlighted by a TFP slowdown in rice production, and remnants
from past institutional arrangements have created constraints to the efficient allocation of
resources, all calling for improvements in land use rights (Kompas et al., 2012).
2.1 Major Reforms in Vietnam’s Agricultural Land Policy
Dated by most authors, Vietnam’s era of central planning ended in 1986 as the State started
to introduce a series of market-oriented agricultural and industrial reforms. In agriculture, a
critical reform was the enactment of the Directive No.10 in 1988, which abolished collective
farming and recognized household as an autonomous unit in the economy. With the issuance
of the Directive, parcels of agricultural land were allocated to families along with certificates
of land use rights (CLUR) for 10-15 years.4 It is worth noting that any crop choice restriction
is stated in the land use purpose of CLUR. For the first time, farmers were granted the right
to make their own decision related to the sales of outputs, or the purchases and uses of inputs;
thus, offering a significant incentive for agricultural production.
A drawback of the Directive No.10 was that households could not trade their land use rights.
Thus, another significant agricultural reform, the Law on Land 1993, took place and granted
farmers five fundamental land use rights. These rights consisted of transfer, exchange, lease,
inheritance, and mortgage right. Since then, the process of land allocation has been steadily
proceeding, along with several adjustments to the Law on Land in 1998, 2001, 2003 and 2008
to encourage the development of the land market. However, the allocated lands remain the
State’s property and must be returned to the State when farmers stop using them. Technically
speaking, farmers are only able to transfer, exchange, lease, bequeath, or mortgage the right
to use land, not the land itself.
The reforms in Vietnam’s land policy was partially motivated by years of struggling with food
3 Stated by the Director of Cooperative Department of The Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development
in the Voice of Vietnam on 15/08/2013. Available in Vietnamese at www.vov.vn/kinh-te/vi-sao-nong-dan-
bo-ruong-274215.vov.
4 A CLUR can be thought of as a license that permits a recipient to use his/her allocated plot of land. Detail
information of the assigned plot is printed on the CLUR issued to its operator including plot code, address,
size, blueprint, acquirement source, expiration date, land use purpose, and personal information of the
operator. The section of land use purpose in CLUR, in which crop choice restrictions are clearly stated (if
any), is the focus of this paper.
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security. Before the reforms, the country experienced severe food shortages, and domestic
subsistence consumption mostly relied on the USSR’s food aid. By 1988, malnutrition become
a widespread phenomenon, 3 million people faced starvation, 12 million people were short
of food, and million tons of rice had to be imported to fight hunger. Since the issuance of
Directive No.10 and Law on Land 1993, privatizing production and granting land use rights
have created a significant incentive for farmers to allocate labor and land more efficiently
leading to as much as 50% of TFP gain during the peak of the reform period. Such remarkable
improvement is underlined by the successful transformation from a rice-importer to become
the second largest rice-exporter in 1997 (for an in-depth review, see World Bank, 1998).
2.2 Land Use Restrictions and RLDP in Vietnam
Although the series of extensive reforms has remarkably changed the landscape of Vietnam’s
agriculture, the State has continued to direct policies towards securing food supply rather
than improving the rural living standard. One of the most prevalent practices is to constraint
farmers’ right to choosing which crop to cultivate. A dominant type of this land use restriction
is RLDP that requires farmers to grow rice on their land. The objective of producing enough
rice to ensure national food sources has been widely stated and repeated. For example, in
2008, the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued Resolution 26/NQ-TW on
agriculture, farmers and rural affairs expressing its determination of keeping land permanently
under rice to ensure national food security. In 2009, the Party Politburo approved the nation’s
food security project aiming to keep rice cultivation area at 3.8 million hectares by 2030,
said Director Nguyen Tri Ngoc of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.5 Two
years later, the project was finalized by the National Assembly and officially part of the Land
Use Master Plan up to 2020 (Resolution 17/2011/QH13).
It is crucial to understand how the process of RLDP works. First, the restriction quota (e.g.,
3.8 million hectares by 2020) is established through the 10-year land use plan by the central
government. After the aggregate target is set, following a top-down approach, the Ministry
of Natural Resources and Environment governs the restriction process by splitting the total
amount among provincial, district and commune levels of its administration. At the lowest
level, communal land offices are responsible for creating detailed land-use plans for each
household in their commune, parcel by parcel and year to year. The specific plan is officially
5 The announcement is also available in English at: www.vietnammarkets.com/vietnamnews.php?nid=3886.
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documented in CLUR issuing to the farmers. Any adjustment, renewal or new issuance of
land and CLUR is regulated following the quota set by the central government.
According to Article 74.1 of the Law on Land 2003, the State plays a leading role in
implementing RLDP by providing protection of specialized land for wet rice cultivation
and preventing illegal conversions to other use purposes. Land users are also required to
participate in RLDP. Article 74.2 asserts that the holders of the specialized land for wet
rice cultivation must be responsible for the land and not convert it to other use purposes
such as perennial crops, forests, aquaculture, and others. There is a strong incentive for
farmers to comply with their assigned plans because violating the State’s direction may lead
to land or crop confiscation. Besides, evaluation by the local authorities is critical for farmers
to renew their current CLUR or apply for other ones. To get farmers involved in RLDP,
the State provides subsidies to rice cultivation at the expense of the production of other
crops. For example, irrigation system, credit, fertilizers, and agricultural services are provided
preferentially to rice farmers (World Bank, 1998).6
2.3 Related Literature
Our work contributes to the emerging literature on institutions, misallocation and aggregate
agricultural productivity. Notably, we connect the misallocation and institution-growth
literature by investigating the distortionary consequences of a specific land policy, RLDP
of Vietnam. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to quantify the aggregate
effects of this particular type of institution for a specific context exploiting micro-level data.
The main strands of literature that our paper can be related to are as follows.
The first and broader strand of literature quantifies the role of agriculture in explaining
income differences across countries. For example, Gollin et al. (2002) and Restuccia et al.
(2008) suggest that productivity gains in the agricultural sector greatly enhance growth and
development. The reason is that a significant share of labor activity takes place in agriculture
where the productivity gaps are the largest. Caselli (2005) reports a ratio of 45 to 1 in
agricultural labor productivity between countries in the 90th and 10th percentile of the
income distribution. Placing focus on the dual economy structure, Chanda and Dalgaard
(2008) and Vollrath (2009) find that aggregate productivity is depressed by a large share of
resources being devoted to agriculture activity, thus, accounting for a large portion of the
6 In Appendix B, we show that our model is affected only by RLDP, not other types of distortions.
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variation in income per capita across countries. Other studies include the work of Lagakos
and Waugh (2013) and Herrendorf and Schoellman(2015).
The second and more recent line of research attempts to explain these large productivity
gaps in agriculture through the lens of resources misallocation caused by specific policies or
institutions.7 For example, Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014a) shows that the Philippines
1988 land reform imposing a ceiling on land holdings lowers farm size by 34% and agricultural
productivity by 17%. Studying the case of China, Adamopoulos et al. (2017) documents that
Chinese land institutions can account for approximately 46% of agricultural productivity loss.
Chen (2017) finds that land titling can raise agricultural productivity by up to 82.5%, with
42% coming from land reallocation and the remaining stemming from efficient-occupational
choice. Gottlieb and Grobovsek (2015) report that removing the communal land tenure
system lowers agricultural employment by 19% and increases aggregate output by 7%.
In this paper, we employ micro-data to shape important features of the model and to perform
quantitative experiments. Therefore, our work is also related to a recent literature on macro-
development including Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Gollin et al. (2014), Buera et al. (2014),
among many others. However, we differ from them in two ways. First, we focus on a specific
type of institution in a particular context, i.e. land use restrictions in Vietnam. Second, we
incorporate spatial characteristics of agricultural land into the model allowing us to account
for land quality. The paper is also related to the empirical development literature studying
the effect of land institution at the micro level such as Goldstein and Udry (2008).
Despite the widespread influence of RLDP in Vietnam, its impacts have not been documented
extensively. At the sectoral level analysis, Nielsen (2003) employs a computable trade model
(GTAP) to stimulate the effect of freeing 5% of the rice land area. This particular liberation
raises production of the other crops by about 3.8%, which in turn leads to a gain of $52
million in welfare driven by exports. Giesecke et al. (2013) apply another computable
general equilibrium model (MONASH) to perform their analysis across industries. Their
simulated results suggest that removing RLDP can increase private consumption by 0.4%
per annum between 2011 and 2030, while also reducing poverty, improving food supply as
well as nutritionally balanced diets. However, the analysis in both papers are conducted at
7 Without specifying underlining sources of misallocation, some studies emphasizes on equating marginal
products to quantify the overall misallocation. Notably, if inputs were allocated efficiently, agricultural
TFP would increase by a factor of 3.6 in Malawi (Restuccia and Santaeulalia-Llopis, 2017), and by a factor
of 2.4 in Ethiopia (Chen et al., 2017).
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the aggregate levels, and the gains are driven by international trade after removing RLDP.
Turning to microeconomic evidence, Markussen et al. (2011) empirically investigate impacts
of RLDP on the behavior of Vietnamese farmers. They conclude that RLDP is positively
correlated with household labor supply due to higher quality inputs being effectively compen-
sated by the local authorities. They also find that restrictions do not affect household income
due to the compensation, but farmers tend to switch to other crops when restrictions are lifted.
Several studies consider other aspects of land rights on Vietnam’s socio-economic outcomes.
Do and Iyer (2008) find that progress in land titling raises the production of multiyear crops
and household labor supply in nonfarm work. Menon et al. (2017) document that land-use
rights held exclusively by women or jointly by couples result in lower household vulnerability
to poverty, and increased household expenditures as well as womens self-employment.
Beyond Vietnam, a significant portion of farmers is also coerced into growing rice in Myanmar.
According to Chapter X of the country’s Farmland Law 2012, farmers are prohibited from
growing alternative crops without permission of the government. Exploiting within-village
variations under regression framework, Kurosaki (2008) finds that being restricted to grow
rice is associated with a decrease of about 8.3% in crop income of Burmese farmers. In
another context, China has a system called “zeren tian” (responsibility land), in which parcels
of agricultural land are allocated to households on the basis of the number of laborers and
households’ ability to engage in agriculture. However, farmers need to deliver a mandatory
quota of grain at a below market price to the authorities in exchange for use rights. The
responsibility land is a major component of Chinese farmland, which accounts for 70%
of total farmland in 2008 (Gao et al., 2017). In several Central Asian countries, such as
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, the States still own the land and severely restrict
many farmers to grow cotton through production quotas. The combination of miserable
incomes and compulsion to produce cotton in these Central Asian countries lead to many
social issues including widespread child labor and forced labor (ILO, 2015).
3 Model
We consider a static economy in which three final goods are produced: (i) rice, (ii) all other
agricultural commodities, and (iii) a non-agricultural product. The two final agriculture goods
are produced in the agricultural sector by heterogeneous farms, and the final non-agricultural
good is produced in the non-agricultural sector by a representative firm. In the model,
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individuals with heterogeneous ability can choose to work as workers in the non-agricultural
sector or farmers in the agricultural sector.
In agriculture, farmers require land to produce. However, a fraction of land is subject to RLDP,
i.e. reserved for rice production only. Consequently, RLDP creates resource misallocation
through two channels. First, it prevents the restricted land from being optimally used, thus,
decreasing land productivity. Second, it distorts the allocation of labor by reducing the
number of workers and increase the number of farmers.
Two essential features of our model are built on previous studies. First, in a spirit of Restuccia
et al. (2008), we model the mechanism that misallocation in agriculture can lower the share
of the non-agricultural worker to satisfy the subsistence consumption. Second, we incorporate
a theoretical contribution of Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014) in modeling individual
choices of occupation. In particular, we borrow one of the key implications of their model in
which the reassignment of individuals between sectors can dampen the gain in sectoral TFP
after moving to the efficient level.8 We proceed to describe the model in more detail below.
3.1 Endowment Description
There are N individuals in the economy. Adopted from Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014),
we assume that individuals are differentiated by their ability z ∈ R+ and an idiosyncratic tax
distortion τ ∈ [0, 1] on non-agricultural income. This distortion serves as an individual-specific
barrier to mobility out of agriculture. We assume the set {z, τ} is drawn from a cumulative
distribution function H(z, τ). Individuals supply their labor inelastically and choose to work
in one of the two mutually exclusive jobs: (i) farmers maximize profit from operating farms,
and (ii) workers work in the non-agricultural sector.
Agricultural land comprises a fixed number of plots indexed by j ∈ J ≡ {1, 2, ..., J}. The
plots are heterogeneous in a two-dimensional suitability {eR, eO} and a restriction status
δ drawn from a spatial distribution F (eR, eO, δ). Here, we let eRj and eOj denote plot j’s
productivity in producing rice (R) and other crops (O) respectively. The indicator δj takes a
value of one if plot j is RLDP-reserved for rice production, and zero otherwise. Farmers then
use the rented plots to produce either rice or other crops to maximize their profits. As shown
8 Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014) quantify the effect of firm-size restriction in India (The Small Scale
Reservation Laws). In a calibrated version of their model, they find that eliminating these laws increases
output per worker by 2% and the overal TFP by 0.75%.
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later, the optimal use of a plot is jointly determined by its two-dimensional suitability and
common crop prices. However, RLDP-restrictions prevent such optimal allocation giving rise
to both land and labor misallocation. To simplify our discussion, all plots are assumed to be
of equal size, normalized to one. Such simplification implies that the total agricultural land
and the total number of plots coincide, i.e. L = J =
∫
j∈J dj.
3.2 Technology and Production
Agriculture Sector - It is important to note that plots of land vary in crop-specific
productivity. Since all plots have the same size of one, the effective units of a plot is thus
determined by its crop-specific productivity. For example, the effective units of plot j in
cultivating rice is eRj, and in growing other crops is eOj. In agriculture, the production unit
is a farm. Suppose a farmer rents two plots j = {1, 2} to produce rice, then his/her total
effective units of land utilized in rice production is eR1 + eR2.
Formally, a farmer needs to incorporate his/her ability in deciding how many effective units
of land to rent and which crop to cultivate. Let us consider a farmer i endowed with ability
zi. If the farmer chooses to produce rice, he/she rents ERi effective units of land. Based
on the logic discussed above, the effective units of land demanded can also be written as
ERi =
∫
j∈JiR
eRj dj, with J
i
R denoting the set of plots being rented in rice production. His/her
real output in producing rice (yR) is given by,
yR(zi) = κz
1−α
i
(∫
j∈JiR
eRj dj
)α
= κz1−αi E
α
Ri (1)
where the relative importance of land in production α ∈ (0, 1) governs the production functions
in producing both rice and other agricultural goods. The constant term κ−1 = αα(1− α)1−α
is here to simplify expressions later on. The integral term depicts the total effective units
of land that farmer i employs if he/she chooses to cultivate rice. Analogously, if the farmer
decides to produce other agricultural goods, he/she rents a set of plot J iO. His/her real output
in producing other crops (yO) can be expressed as follows,
yO(zi) = κz
1−α
i
(∫
j∈JiO
eOj dj
)α
= κz1−αi E
α
Oi (2)
In our model, RLDP restrictions happen at the plot level, not farm level (further discussion
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is provided in Section 3.4). Here, farmers solve the usual profit maximization problem. We
let {qR, qO} depict the unit costs of an effective unit of land in producing rice and other crops
respectively. Farmer i’s profit maximization problem in producing rice is given by,
piR(zi) = max
ER
{
pRκz
1−α
i E
α
Ri − qRERi
}
(3)
with {pR, pO} are the prices of rice and non-rice crops. First order conditions imply,
piR(zi) = zi
(
p
1/α
R
qR
) α
1−α
(4)
Analogously, if he/she chooses to produce other agricultural goods, the profit is given by,
piO(zi) = zi
(
p
1/α
O
qO
) α
1−α
(5)
Non-Agriculture Sector - Since our focus is on the agricultural sector, we keep production
in the non-agriculture simple. The output is produced by a representative firm with access
to constant returns to scale technology. To produce, this firm requires only effective labor as
an input. The production function simply takes the form,
YM =
∫
i∈NM
zidi (6)
where YM is the total amount of non-agricultural output produced and NM is the set of
workers (the set of farmers is then NA). The representative firm maximizes profit by deciding
how many efficiency units of labor to hire. Denoting w and pM the unit prices of efficient
labor and non-agricultural good respectively, firm optimization implies w = pM . Thus, the
representative firm pays a worker with ability zi an amount of zipM .
Next, we incorporate the idiosyncratic distortion τi into the model as an non-agricultural
income tax of rate [1−τi] for working in the non-agricultural sector. This distortion is a wedge
in the occupational choice decision between farmer and non-agricultural worker. It allows
us to reproduce two important targets including: (i) the distribution of farm value-added,
and (ii) the sectoral gap in labor productivity. Therefore, the net income of an individual i if
he/she chooses to be a worker is given by w˜(zi, τi) = (1− τi)zipM .
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Instead of assuming a joint cdf H(z, τ), there are different approaches taken by prior studies.
For example, we can have just one common fixed cost of mobility such as the work of
Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014a). However, doing so will change the shape of individual
ability distribution when requiring the model to reproduce the distribution of individual
earnings.9 Another approach is to have a joint distribution of agricultural and non-agricultural
ability as implemented in Lagakos and Waugh (2013) and Adamopoulos et al. (2017). This
approach will require two more moments for our model to match relevant targets.10 Since
our focus is on land use misallocation in agriculture and labor moving out of agriculture,
we shy away from the second method to avoid unnecessary complication. Therefore, as in
Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014), we prefer the use of the idiosyncratic distortion
for two reasons: (i) it provides a straightforward setup in our context, and (ii) it allows
for an extra degree of freedom in reproducing individual earnings, thus, keeping the ability
distribution from being compromised.
3.3 Labor Allocation
In this section, we turn our discussion to the allocation of labor across sectors. The individuals
choose between one of the two mutually exclusive jobs: farmer and non-agricultural worker.
In addition, if an individual decides to become a farmer, he/she can further choose to produce
either rice or other crops.
• Proposition 1 There exist a threshold, denoted by τ¯ , such that individual i becomes a
farmer if τi ≥ τ¯ , and a worker otherwise. Conditional on being a farmer, the individual
is indifferent about which crop to produce, i.e. piR(zi) = piO(zi).
The proof of Proposition 1 comes from the indifference conditions between the choices of
occupation and production. Let us first consider the problem of choosing which crop to
produce by a farmer. From equations (4) and (5), it can be shown that the profit difference
across crop production choices for any farmer depends only on the output prices and rental
9 The ability distribution will be discontinuous at the threshold of occupational choice with the lowest ability
of non-agricultural workers being higher than the highest ability of farmers.
10 These moments include the sectoral earnings correlation and the dispersion in non-agricultural earnings.
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rates of effective units of land. In particular,
piR(zi)− piO(zi) = zi
(p1/αR
qR
) α
1−α
−
(
p
1/α
O
qO
) α
1−α
 (7)
Here, farmer i will produce rice if piR(zi)− piO(zi) ≥ 0, and other agricultural goods otherwise.
It is clear that the production choice is independent from individual endowment {zi, τi}.
If the inequality pR/q
α
R > pO/q
α
O is satisfied, then all farmers would choose to produce rice.
Conversely, if pR/q
α
R < pO/q
α
O, all farmers would engage in production of other agricultural
goods. We assume that the indifference curve for consumption goods does not cross the
consumption axes. In this way, corner solutions will not be possible, and the case where
pR/q
α
R 6= pO/qαO cannot constitute an equilibrium. Therefore, in an equilibrium where the
equality pR/q
α
R = pO/q
α
O must be satisfied, a farmer is indifferent about which crop to produce
piR(zi) = piO(zi) = pi(zi). This profit indifference condition also suggests a common price ratio
λ = qR/p
1/α
R = qO/p
1/α
O across farms and crops.
An individual i with a set {zi, τi} maximizes his/her earnings by choosing to be a non-
agricultural worker for an amount of w˜(zi, τi) or a farmer for a profit of pi(zi). Thus,
individuals’ occupational choice can be described by the indifference condition between
earnings across the two occupations. Equalizing w˜(zi, τi) and pi(zi) gives us the threshold τ¯ ,
such that,
(1− τ¯)pMλ α1−α = 1 (8)
Intuitively, the idiosyncratic distortion τi can be thought of as any type of barriers to labor
mobility across sectors. For example, the set of farmers i ∈ NA includes those whose face a
high enough migration cost, i.e. τi ≥ τ¯ , so that they decide to stay in agriculture. Analogously,
the set of workers i ∈ NM are those enjoying lower cost of mobility, i.e. τi < τ¯ , thus, moving
to the non-agricultural sector. Utilizing the common price ratio λ = qR/p
1/α
R = qO/p
1/α
O and
solutions to farm profit maximization as in equation (3), we can express the optimizing rules
for farmer i as follows,
pi(zi) =
zi
λα/1−α
(9)
pRyR(zi) = pOyO(zi) =
zi
(1− α)λα/1−α (10)
qRER(zi) = qOEO(zi) =
αzi
(1− α)λα/1−α (11)
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By presenting this way, it is clear that farm profit (9), value-added (10), and expenditure
on effective units of land rented (11) are equal across crop choices for each farmer. With α
and λ being common across farms, equation (10) states that variation in farm value-added
linearly depends on variation in individual ability. This characterization provides a simple
mapping between the model distribution of farmers’ ability and the micro-data’s distribution
of farms’ value-added in our calibration.
3.4 Restrictions and Land Allocation
In this section, we turn to discuss land use allocation. There are J size-one plots of agricultural
land in the economy, such that L =
∫
J
dj is the total agricultural land (Section 3.1). The
plots are heterogeneous in a two-dimensional suitability {eR, eO} and a restriction status δ
drawn from the spatial distribution F (eR, eO, δ). Here, δ is an indicator, with the convention
that δj = 1 if plot j is subject to RLDP. Therefore, the total restricted area in agriculture
can be expressed as
∫
δjdj, and the total unrestricted land is simply
∫
(1− δj)dj.
In the absence of land use restrictions, all farmers maximize their profits implying that plots
of land are optimally utilized. This means the land supplier (household) rents out the plots at
their highest values, and the plot renter (farmers) will put the plot to its best use. However,
due to RLDP restrictions, plots with δ = 1 can only be used in rice production. Consequently,
the values of these plots are distorted. Consider plot j ∈ J with a suitability set {eRj, eOj},
the value of this plot is equal to qReRj if it is used in rice production. Similarly, if plot j is
utilized for non-rice production, its value is given by qOeOj . Thus, the optimal value of plot j
follows a rule given by,
max
{
qReRj, qOeOj
}
= λmax
{
p
1/α
R eRj, p
1/α
O eOj
}
, ∀j ∈ J (12)
where we make use of the equality λ = qR/p
1/α
R = qO/p
1/α
O (see Proposition 1) to derive the
right hand side of equation (12). Nevertheless, if plot j is reserved for rice production, i.e.
δj = 1, then its value is simply fixed at [qReRj]. Put it differently, there is no other choices
regarding land use for the restricted plots.
Equation (12) also states that the optimal use of a plot is determined by the relative
suitabilities and crop prices. For example, if (eRj/eOj)
α > pO/pR, then it is efficient to devote
plot j for rice production, and vice versa. Let D be a dummy variable indicating the optimal
use of all plots, with the convention that D = 1 if it is optimal for a plot to produce rice.
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Then, the optimizing rule for land use in equation (12) can also be described by,
Dj ∈ arg max
{
Djp
1/α
R eRj + (1−Dj)p1/αO eOj
}
, ∀j ∈ J (13)
With this way of denotation, we can express the total land rent, which is aggregated from
equation (12), in a more compact form. Particularly, the total land rent in rice production,
denoted by QR, is given by,
QR = λp
1/α
R
(∫
eRjδj dj +
∫
eRj(1− δj)Dj dj
)
(14)
and in the production of other agricultural goods, denoted by QO, is as the following,
QO = λp
1/α
O
∫
eOj(1− δj)(1−Dj) dj (15)
In equation (14), the first and second integral terms are the total effective units of land used
in rice production for the restricted plots and unrestricted plots respectively. Analogously,
the value of the integral in equation (15) represents the total effective units of land utilized
for the production of other agricultural commodities, conditional on not being restricted.
3.5 Consumption
The representative household uses all of its income to purchase consumption goods. Its
total income can stem from three main sources: (i) individual income from workers and
farmers W =
∫
i∈NM w˜(zi, τi)di +
∫
i∈NA pi(zi)di, (ii) a lump sum transfer T coming from
idiosyncratic distortions, and (iii) land income from renting out plots of land for farm
production Q = QR +QO. The household seeks to maximize its utility subject to the budget
constraint pRCR + pOCO + pMCM = W + T +Q. It has preferences over the consumption of
agricultural and non-agricultural goods described by the following utility function,
lnU = (1− β) lnCM + β ln
([
φC
ζ−1
ζ
R + (1− φ)C
ζ−1
ζ
O
] ζ
ζ−1
− ψ
)
(16)
where {CR, CO} denote the total consumption of each agricultural good, and CM is the
total consumption of the non-agricultural good. The parameters {φ, β} ∈ (0, 1) govern the
preference weights across consumption goods, and ζ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across
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crops. Finally, the parameter ψ depicts the subsistence requirement for agricultural goods in
the spirit of Restuccia et al. (2008). Thus, the household always prioritizes the consumption
of agricultural goods up to ψ level. After that, it may allocate the remaining income to all
goods according to their weights. A standard argument from first order conditions implies,
pR
pO
(
CR
CO
)1/ζ
=
φ
1− φ ,
pMCM
pRCR + pOCO − χ(pR, pO) =
1− β
β
(17)
where we let χ(pR, pO) = ψ
[
pR
(
φ
pR
)ζ
+ pO
(
1−φ
pO
)ζ]1/1−ζ
. Intuitively, the right hand equality
of equation (17) states that the household always devote χ(pR, pO) amount of its income to
agricultural goods in order to survive. After meeting the subsistence requirement, it can
freely allocate the remaining income to non-agricultural goods pMCM and non-subsistent
agricultural goods pRCR + pOCO − χ(pR, pO) according to the preference weights.
4 Equilibrium and Misallocation
In this section, we first define a competitive equilibrium of the model where RLDP is prevalent.
Then, we describe the effects of the land use restrictions on both land and labor allocation.
To do so, we compare the current economy of Vietnam to a hypothetical economy where all
areas subject to RLDP are liberated.
4.1 Equilibrium
We consider the static competitive equilibrium of the model in the presence of RLDP,
consisting of: (i) an output price set {pR, pO, pM}, (ii) an input price set {w, qR, qO}, (iii) a set
of farmer decision functions
{
Eg(z), yg(z)
}
g∈{R,O}, (iv) a threshold characterizing occupational
choices τ¯ , (v) a set of indicators {Dj, δj} ∀j ∈ J describing plots’ uses and restriction status,
and (vi) a bundle of consumption choices {CR, CO, CM}, such that,
• Given prices, the threshold τ¯ is the optimal occupational choice for all individuals, and
Dj ∀j ∈ J is the optimal use for all unrestricted plots.
• Given prices, the allocation rules {Eg(z), yg(z)}g∈{R,O} are profit maximizing for all
individuals choosing to be farmers.
• Given prices, the bundle {CR, CO, CM} is utility maximizing for the representative
household, subject to the budget constraints.
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• Representative firm optimizes, budget balances, and all markets clear,
1. Output markets from equation (6, 10) and budget balance,
pMCM = pM
∫
i∈NM
zidi ,
∑
g∈{R,O}
pgCg =
λα/α−1
1− α
∫
i∈NA
zidi (18)
2. Land market from equation (11, 14, 15) and the household’s land income,
QR +QO =
αλα/α−1
1− α
∫
i∈NA
zidi (19)
4.2 Misallocation
In this section, we describe the productivity effects of RLDP through two channels: land
use misallocation and distortions in occupational choice. We compare the current economy
of Vietnam to a hypothetical economy where all restrictions are liberated. To keep our
discussion intuitive and straightforward, we provide examples in which we abstract from the
offsetting effects caused by changes in prices.
• Proposition 2 Liberating RLDP raises the aggregate agricultural output and agricul-
tural TFP by increasing the average effective stock of agricultural land.
The intuition is quite simple. Removing restrictions means that plots of agricultural land can
be put to their best use. As a result, the effective stock of agricultural land is maximized,
leading to an increase in the agricultural total factor productivity. Let us proceed to denote
by YA = pRYR + pOYO the aggregate agricultural output (real agricultural GDP), and by
TFPA the agricultural total factor productivity. Then, we proceed to formalize an equation
that allows us to quantify the value of TFPA. First, we derive the total agricultural output
YA from equation (10) as follows,
YA = z¯ANA
λα/α−1
1− α (20)
where z¯A is the average farmer ability, and z¯ANA =
∫
i∈NA zidi is the total stock of farmer
ability. Analogously, we proceed to denote by E¯ = (QR +QO)
/
λL the average effective stock
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of land (please refer to equations (14) and (15) for full expressions). Then, the land market’s
clearing condition from equation (19) can be rewritten as the following,
λ
1
α−1 =
E¯L
z¯ANA
1− α
α
(21)
Combining equations (20) and (21), we are able to express the aggregate agricultural output
as a function of total agricultural land (L), total number of farmers (NA), and agricultural
TFP. The function takes a familiar form given by,
YA =
[(
E¯
α
)α(
z¯A
1− α
)1−α]
LαN1−αA
≡ [TFPA] LαN1−αA
(22)
where the term TFPA representing the agricultural TFP will be our primary focus when
performing a quantitative analysis. In addition, the functional form of TFPA states that any
improvement in the average effective stock of land (E¯) or farmer ability (z¯A) will raise the
agricultural TFP. Next, for the purpose of simplicity, let us consider a simple case where all
prices and labor allocation are held fixed. We denote by E¯∗ the average effective stock of
land at the efficient level. From the discussion in Section 3.4, the total gain in the average
effective stock of land stemming from RLDP liberation is given by:
E¯∗ − E¯ = 1
L
∫
δj
[
max
{
p
1/α
R eRj, p
1/α
O eOj
}
− p1/αR eRj
]
dj
=
1
L
∫
δj(1−Dj)
(
p
1/α
O eOj − p1/αR eRj
)
dj
(23)
Here, the effective units of land are weighted by the corresponding constant prices. The
dummy δ indicates plots’ restriction status. Thus, there is no gain in the effective stock of
land stemming from the unrestricted plots with δ = 0. As in equation (12), the maximization
term here regulates the optimal land use for all of the plots.
First, equation (23) states that not all restricted plots are distorted in land use. For example,
if plot j’s optimal choice is to produce rice, i.e. max
{
p
1/α
R eRj, p
1/α
O eOj
}
= p
1/α
R eRj, then
RLDP does not change its optimal use. Thus, the term in the square bracket of equation
(23) takes a value of zero. However, if the optimal choice of plot j is to produce other crops,
i.e. max
{
p
1/α
R eRj, p
1/α
O eOj
}
= p
1/α
O eOj, then RLDP prevents the plot from being optimally
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utilized. It is clear that the loss in the effective stock of land is captured by the difference
term
[
p
1/α
O eOj − p1/αR eRj
]
. Therefore, in this simple case, a gain in the agricultural TFP and
aggregate output from eliminating RLDP is entirely induced by an increase in the average
effective stock of land, given by,
Y ∗A
YA
=
TFP ∗A
TFPA
=
(
E¯∗
E¯
)α
(24)
This gain equation also suggests that our productivity gain is sensitive to the parameter
value α. In the calibration section, we take a conservative approach by choosing a low value
of parameter α. In addition, we cautiously note that there are price effects offsetting the
gain from resource reallocation. The reason is that inputs (labor and land) and output (rice
and others) are not perfect substitutes. These price effects manifest themselves through both
crop choice and occupational choice. In the example given above, we abstract from the price
effects for the sake of simplicity. However, we do allow prices to change in our actual analysis.
In the next stage, we turn to discuss changes in occupational choice. As the agricultural
sector becomes more productive due to RLDP liberation, there will be a reallocation of
labor across sectors. This movement has non-negligible impacts on both agricultural and
non-agricultural productivity.
• Proposition 3 Liberating RLDP releases farmers out of agriculture, thus, raising the
total output in the non-agricultural sector.
The intuition is as follows. First, the supply of effective stocks of land is distorted by RDLP.
Consequently, the agricultural TFP and the total agricultural output in the restricted economy
are both lower than the ones of the efficient level. Since the representative household must
secure the subsistence consumption, it has to allocate a significant share of its members into
agriculture to compensate for the loss in the total agricultural output stemming from land
use misallocation.11 From Proposition 2, liberating RLDP will raise the agricultural output
by improvement in TFPA, thus, reducing the burden of subsistence consumption requirement.
Hence, it follows that a number of farmers will be released to the non-agricultural sector as
RLDP restrictions being lifted.
11 Please refer to Restuccia et al. (2008) for a discussion on this topic. The authors also provide a simple
but intuitive setting in which misallocation in agriculture can lower the share of non-agricultural labor to
satisfy the subsistence consumption.
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To facilitate the discussion, let us relax the assumption of fixed labor allocation in the example
given in Proposition 2. The output and input prices are still being held constant, hence,
abstracting from the offsetting price effects. We proceed to express the right hand equality
of equation (17) as βYM = (1− β)
[
YA − χ
]
. Then, the non-agricultural output gain can be
expressed as follows,
Y ∗M
YM
=
Y ∗A − χ
YA − χ = 1 +
Y ∗A − YA
YA − χ (25)
where Y ∗M is the non-agricultural output at the efficient level. Equation (25) states two
important points. First, as the total agricultural output increases (Y ∗A > YA), the total
non-agricultural output must also increase (Y ∗M > YM). Second, the higher the level of
subsistence consumption requirement, the larger the effect of misallocation. In other words,
the term [YA− χ] < YA captures the amplified output gain/loss in the non-agricultural sector
caused by misallocation in the agricultural sector. For example, the smaller the value of
YA − χ, the higher the value of (Y ∗A − YA)/(YA − χ).
From equation (6), i.e. YM =
∫
i∈NM zidi, it is clear that Y
∗
M > YM is driven by additional
workers moving to the non-agricultural sector, not the other way around. Therefore, our model
suggests that the gain/loss in the agricultural productivity also reflects the increase/decrease
in the supply of workers in the non-agricultural sector.
Let us denote by NS and z¯S the total number and the average ability of those switching
occupation after moving to the efficient level. As the assumption of fixed labor allocation is
relaxed, the expression in equation (22) suggests the gain in agricultural output as follows,
Y ∗A
YA
=
TFP ∗A
TFPA
(
NA −NS
NA
)1−α
=
(
E¯∗
E¯
)α(
NAz¯A −NS z¯S
NAz¯A
)1−α
(26)
where the term (NAz¯A−NS z¯S)/(NA−NS) is the average farmer ability, and the term NA−NS
is the total number of farmers at the efficient level. The common terms NA − NS and L
are both canceled out, thus, reducing to the last expression of equation (26). The equation
suggests that the gain in agricultural output is a geometric weighted mean of a change in
the effective stock of land and a change in farmer ability stock. Next, the non-agricultural
output gain can be expressed as follows,
Y ∗M
YM
=
NM z¯M +NS z¯S
NM z¯M
(27)
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Here, NM and z¯M are the total number and the average ability of the existing workers. The
derivation is quite simple. The term NM z¯M =
∫
i∈NM zidi is the current level of the non-
agricultural output, and the term NM z¯M +NS z¯S =
∫
i∈NM,S zidi expresses the non-agricultural
output at the efficient level. Dividing the later by former yields the equality (27). This
equation states that the gain in non-agricultural output is affected by a change in the stock
of worker ability.
• Proposition 4 Liberating RLDP raises both the average farm size and the agricultural
TFP. However, it reduces the average ability of both farmers and workers through the
reallocation of labor across sectors. Such reductions offset the gain in agricultural TFP
and decrease non-agricultural labor productivity.
We continue with our example in Proposition 3. Since liberating RLDP leads to a decrease
in the number of farmers, it certainly induces an increase in the average farm size. From the
second equality of equation (26), we decompose the gain in agricultural TFP as follows,
TFP ∗A
TFPA
=
(
E¯∗
E¯
)α(
1 +
NS(z¯A − z¯S)
NAz¯A −NS z¯A
)1−α
(28)
Here, we can see that the change in agricultural TFP is driven by changes in both labor and
land characteristics. As we discussed in Proposition 2, lifting RLDP leads to an increase
in the average effective stock of land, thus, contributing to the gain in agricultural TFP.
This gain can be reduced or amplified depending on the relationship between z¯A and z¯S.
For example, if z¯A < z¯S, the reallocation of labor out of agriculture will offset the gain in
agricultural TFP coming from land reallocation. Analogously, from equation (27), the change
in non-agricultural labor productivity is given by,
Y ∗M
NM +NS
NM
YM
=
NM z¯M +NS z¯S
NM z¯M +NS z¯M
= 1 +
NS(z¯S − z¯M)
NM z¯M +NS z¯M
(29)
Note that labor productivity in non-agriculture is obtained by dividing output by the total
number of workers. Since the representative firm requires only effective labor to produce,
non-agricultural labor productivity is also non-agricultural TFP. From equation (29), it is
clear that the change in non-agricultural labor productivity is also influenced by the average
ability of those moving out of agriculture. For example, if z¯S < z¯M , the non-agricultural
labor productivity will decrease, and vice versa.
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With reasonable parameter values in line with the calibration (labor productivity in non-
agriculture is much higher than in agriculture), the mobility cost τ is negatively correlated
with individual ability z. We denote by τ¯ ∗ an efficient threshold characterizing occupational
choice. From the discussion of equation (8), it follows that individuals with τi ≥ τ¯ ∗ will remain
in agriculture. Since liberating RLDP will reduce the number of farmers, the inequality
τ¯ ∗ > τ¯ must be satisfied. Therefore, the average ability of those moving out of agriculture
(those endowed with τ¯ ∗ > τi > τ¯) will be lower than the average ability of the existing
workers, but higher than the one of the remaining farmers, i.e. z¯A < z¯S < z¯M . This movement
suggests a reduction in the average ability of both farmers and workers. Therefore, equation
(28) suggests that the reduction in average farmer ability offset the gain in agricultural TFP
stemming from the improvement of effective stock of land. From equation (29), the average
ability of the new workers is relatively lower than the existing ones, which unambiguously
translates to lower labor productivity in the non-agricultural sector at the efficient level.
This implication coincides with the contribution of Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014) in
which the reassignment of individuals between sectors can dampen the gain in TFP after
moving to the efficient level.
5 Connecting Model and Data
Our strategy is to calibrate the model parameters in a benchmark economy to the restricted
economy where RLDP is prevalent. We proceed in two steps. In Section 5.1, we first describe
our assumptions on the functional forms of the distributions of individual characteristics
H(z, τ) and land characteristics F (eR, eO, δ). In Section 5.2, given the assumed distributions,
we calibrate the model parameters to match relevant data targets, such that the model
equations constitute an equilibrium.
5.1 Functional Forms
Individual Characteristics - We need the joint cdf H(z, τ) to closely reproduce farm
value-added distribution and labor productivity difference across the two sectors. Instead of
directly parameterizing H(z, τ), we follow an approach of Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas
(2014) in parameterizing the conditional distribution H(z|τ). To do so, we first assume that
the idiosyncratic distortions τ is drawn from a uniform distribution in the range of [0, 1].
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Then, the ability distribution is assumed to be conditionally log-normal taking the form of,
log zi = γ0 + γ1 log τi + i (30)
where i is a random variable drawn from a normal distribution with a variance of σ
2
 .
Here, the parameter γ0 serves as a scale. The two parameters γ1 and σ together governs
the distribution of ability. More importantly, the value of γ1 regulates the correlation
between ability and distortions, thus, allowing us to reproduce the sectoral difference in labor
productivity. A negative value of γ1 implies a negative correlation between ability z and
distortion τ . Consequently, low ability individuals tend to face high mobility barrier creating
an incentive for them to stay in agriculture. This characterization allows us to precisely
match the large gap in labor productivity across the two sectors.
Land Characteristics - For the distribution of crop-specific productivity and restriction
status, we want the cdf F (eR, eO, δ) to reproduce the empirical distribution of plot values
and restrictions. We assume that the joint distribution of the two-dimensional productivity
{eR, eO} follows a bivariate log-normal distribution with zero means and covariance matrix,12
Σ =
{
σ2R σRO
σRO σ
2
O
}
(31)
where σRO, σ
2
R, and σ
2
O are the covariance and variance of rice and non-rice productivity (in log
form). The value of σRO/(σRσO) is the correlation coefficient for productivities across crops.
Given the joint distribution of the two-dimensional productivity, plots face a probability of
being restricted to RLDP according to the Bernoulli conditional distribution. We assume the
following functional form of restriction probability across plots,
P(δj = 1|eRj, eOj) = η0 + η1 log eRj + η2 log eOj (32)
where P(δj = 1|eRj, eOj) denotes the probability of plot j being restricted, conditional on
its two-dimensional productivity. As discussed previously, the restriction status δj takes
a value of one if the plot j is subject to RLDP, and zero otherwise. The three associated
parameters {η0, η1, η2} together regulate the share of restricted plots, the correlation between
12 The means will be scaled by crop prices in our model. Therefore, we can set them to zero for simplicity
without affecting the results.
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restrictions and rice productivity, and the correlation between restrictions and non-rice
productivity. Intuitively, negative values of η1 and η2 suggest that relatively low productivity
plots in cultivating rice and non-rice are more likely to face RLDP-restrictions. To sum up,
the distribution of land characteristic F (eR, eO, δ) can be described by a set of six model
parameters {σR, σO, σRO, η0, η1, η2}.
5.2 Calibration Choices
We are now ready to discuss our calibration choices. The restricted economy is characterized
by 16 model parameters. We take two of them from previous literature and normalize one
parameter to unity {α, ζ, pR}. The other seven parameters need to be calibrated within the
model {γ0, γ1, σ, L/N, φ, β, ψ/N}. The remaining six parameters are estimated directly from
the joint population distribution of land characteristics {σR, σO, σRO, η0, η1, η2}.
Price, Technology, Substitutability {pR, α, ζ} - Since what matters in the model is the
relative price, we start by normalizing pR to one. Then, the technology parameter α regulating
the income share of land is set at 0.35. This choice of value is in a reasonable range of
previous studies on developing economies. For example, Haley (1991) reports a land share of
0.34 for Asian countries, Restuccia and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2017) document a share of 0.39
for Malawi, and Adamopoulos et al. (2017) estimate a land income share of 0.36 for China.
Our choice of value is slightly below the average so as to be conservative in estimating the
effects of land misallocation. The parameter ζ, which regulates the substitutability across
agricultural goods, is set to 2.63. This choice reflects the midpoint between a value of 2.44 to
2.80 in Sotelo (2015) and a value of 2.82 in Costinot et al. (2016).
Table 1: Parameterization 1 - Targets and Results
Parameter Value Target
pR 1 Normalization
α 0.35 Land to labor income share
ζ 2.63 Elasticity of substitution
Labor Characteristics {γ0, γ1, σ, L/N} - As discussed at the end of Section 3.3, we want
our model distribution of ability to reproduce the distribution of farm value-added. Thus,
we utilize the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS) dataset, which
is an unbalanced panel survey of six waves over 2002 - 2012. The sample of this dataset
reflects the samples of the population census and the representative Vietnam Household
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Living Standards Survey. Therefore, this dataset is likely to be nationally representative and
comparable with the aggregate statistics. We proceed to exclude households not involved
in agriculture production. Then, farm value-added is computed by subtracting costs of
intermediate inputs from total values of output produced.13 We also trim 1% tails to rule
out potential measurement errors. We thus obtain a dispersion of log value-added of 0.96.
Another important statistics is the labor productivity ratio between the agricultural and
non-agricultural sector. From World Bank collection of development indicators 2002 - 2012,
we obtain an average of employment share in agriculture of 52.92% an average of agricultural
value added share of 20.1%. These statistics translate to a relative labor productivity ratio
between the two sectors of approximately 4.47.14
For the conditional distribution of ability, we proceed to set the parameter γ0 at 7.36, such
that the average farm value-added is 632 US dollars as in VARHS (2003 constant price).
We then proceed to estimate the other two parameters {γ1, σ}. Particularly, we want the
model to generate a relative labor productivity ratio between the two sectors of 4.47 in the
equilibrium. This target implies a value of γ1 = −0.68. Then we use σ to reproduce the
dispersion of log value-added of 0.96. This require a parameter value of σ = 0.96. For the
aggregate endowment of labor and land, we set the ratio of L/N to 0.45 implying an average
farm size of 0.86 hectares as observed in VARHS over 2002 - 2012.
Table 2: Parameterization 2 - Targets and Results
Parameter Value Target
γ0 7.36 Average farm value-added ($632)
γ1 -0.68 Sectoral relative labor productivity (4.47)
σ 0.96 Farm value-added dispersion(0.96)
L/N 0.45 Average farm size of 0.86 hectares
φ 0.25 Share rice land in agriculture (54%)
β 0.002 Long-run agricultural employment (5%)
ψ/N 147.2 Current agricultural employment (52.9%)
Preferences and Endowment {φ, β, ψ/N} - Next, we target the share of land dedicated to
rice production in calibrating the preference for rice φ. Given the distributions of individual
13 The costs of intermediate inputs include seeds, saplings, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, non-durable tools,
energy, fuel, maintenance, irrigation fees, transportation, and other minor costs.
14 Agricultural labor productivity is 0.2010.5292 × GDPLabor . Non-agricultural labor productivity is 0.7990.4708 × GDPLabor . We
then divide the later by the former to obtain a labor productivity ratio of 4.47.
24
and land characteristics, we set φ = 0.25 such that the model yields the share of total rice
land in agriculture of 54%, as reported by the General Statistics Office over the period of
2002 - 2012. We then follow the literature in setting β and ψ, such as the work of Restuccia
et al. (2008), Lagakos and Waugh (2013), and Chen (2017). Here, the value of β determines
the long-run share of agriculture employment of 5% where the subsistence constraint is
not binding (ψ = 0). Then, the value of ψ characterizes the current share of agriculture
employment of 52.92%. These targets imply the values of β = 0.002 and ψ/N = 147.2. Prior
studies, e.g. Gollin et al. (2002, 2007) and Restuccia et al. (2008), suggest a lower long-run
share of agriculture employment requiring a smaller value of β. As shown in Section 6.2,
moving the value of β closer to zero would imply slightly stronger misallocation effects.
Land Characteristics {σR, σO, σRO, η0, η1, η2} - The set of six model parameters regulating
the distribution of land characteristic F (eR, eO, δ) is acquired directly from the population
moments being estimated as follows. We first obtain a precise measure of the specialized land
for rice production from the Local Land Use Atlas 2007 (LLUA) provided by the Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Development.15 We then digitize the maps using ArcGIS. Our process
of transformation is done by requiring the coordinate grids of the maps and the shapefile
to exactly match. As a result, we obtain full information on which area is for agriculture
production and which agricultural area is subject to RLDP.
In Figure 1a, we present the spatial distribution of land use. Here, agriculture land consists
of yellow and blue areas. The areas in yellow are those reserved for rice production only. The
areas in blue are where farmers can cultivate other types of crop. We proceed to sample
100,000 equal size plots (spatial data points) on the agricultural land (yellow and blue areas).
These plots represent the ‘empirical plots’ guiding our parameter choices in calibration. Each
of these plots contains information on restriction status, i.e. whether it is located in the yellow
or blue areas. As reported in Resolution 29/2004/QH11, the share of the restricted area is
around 44.69%, which is close to the share of restricted plots of 0.448 in our constructed
dataset. Hence, the plots drawn from the digitized atlas are reasonably representative.
Next, we employ the Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) database which provides the
potential yields (in tons/ha/year) for different crops across micro-geographical units. The
15 There is a total of 63 maps corresponding to 63 provinces/cities. These maps are conducted by the
district/commune land offices throughout the country and reported to the General Department of Land
Administration. It is worth noting that the National Assembly 2011 established RLDP restriction quotas
for each province in the next ten years based on the detail information of LLUA.
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potential yields here depend on purely exogenous agro-climatic conditions. Each unit (cell) is
about 10 km2 (5 arc-minute to be specific). Moreover, the potential yields are reported for
different alternatives depending on water sources (irrigated and rain-fed) and agricultural
practices (high, low, and intermediate inputs intensity).16 We choose the yields associated with
irrigated water sources and intermediate input intensity, which closely describe agricultural
practices in Vietnam.17
Figure 1: Spatial Distributions of Restrictions and Rice Yields
(a) Land Use Distribution (b) Potential Yields for Rice
From GAEZ database, we have information on potential yields for wetland rice and other 17
major crops for each cell.18 In Figure 1b, we illustrate the spatial distribution of potential
yields for rice across the country. Combining with the spatial distributions of restrictions
discussed previously, we have full information on restriction statuses and potential yields
across 18 crops for our 100,000 representative plots. Next, we employ three waves of Vietnam
Household Living Standards Surveys (VHLSS) conducted in even years from 2010 to 2014 to
obtain a farm-gate price for each crop. For each crop-by-farm, a unit value is computed by
dividing output values by physical quantity. A common set of prices is thus constructed as
sample-wide averages for each crop in each province.
16 Low inputs represent labor intensive practice without the use of fertilizer, pesticides, and chemicals (FPC for
short). Intermediate inputs represent medium labor intensity practice with hand tools, some mechanization,
and some FPC. High inputs represent low labor intensity with full mechanization, full utilization of FPC,
and other advanced techniques. See www.gaez.fao.org and Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2018) for details.
17 Note that management techniques (irrigation and intermediate input intensity) are common across cells
and crops. This construction from GAEZ is consistent with our model in the sense that farm value-added
is the same across land and crop for a given ability.
18 Since dryland rice comprises a very small fraction of the total rice area, we focus on the wetland rice here.
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Our last step is to value each of these plots across crop choices (rice or non-rice). In a
manner analogous to equation (12) and (13), plot j’s value in cultivating crop k is captured
by {p1/αk ekj}. Thus, the value of plot j in producing rice is given by p1/αR eRj , where eRj is the
potential rice yield of the plot and pR is the price of rice. On the other hand, plot j’s value
in producing other crops is obtained by taking the average of plot values in producing the
other crops. In summary, we construct 100,000 plots carrying the spatial properties of the
population distribution in plot by crop choice values and restrictions. This dataset provides
us a set of population moments regarding land characteristics.
Table 3: Parameterization 3 - Targets and Results
Parameter Value Target
σR 0.42 Plot value dispersion in producing rice
σO 1.37 Plot value dispersion in producing non-rice
σRO 0.14 Plot value correlation across crop choices
η0 0.44 Share of restricted area
η1 -0.19 Plot value partial correlation in rice and restriction
η2 -0.02 Plot value partial correlation in non-rice and restriction
In the model, the price of each crop is common across farms. Thus, the empirical dispersion
and covariance of log plot value conditional on producing rice and non-rice equal to the
model dispersion and covariance of log plot productivity in rice and non-rice production,
i.e. σR = 0.42, σO = 1.37, and σRO = 0.14. Next, the share of RLDP-restricted area is 44%,
which translates to a value of η0 = 0.44. Finally, we choose η1 = −0.19 and η2 = −0.02 to
match the coefficient estimates from regressing RLDP-restriction status on log plot value in
rice and non-rice production.
Table 1, 2 and 3 summarizes the values of all 16 model parameters. Recall that the first three
parameters {pR, α, ζ} are either normalized or assigned directly based on previous literature.
The remaining 13 parameters are determined by requiring the model to exactly reproduce
relevant data targets. We refer to this calibrated economy as the benchmark economy. Given
these parameter values, Figure 2 and 3 show how well the calibrated model matches the data.
In Figure 2a, we sort farms into octiles according to their value-added and plot the share of
agricultural GDP by farms of each octile. Figure 2b shows the fraction of farms falling into
different value-added classes, ranging from 0-30%, 30-60%, ..., 180-210%, and above 210% of
the average. Analogous to Figure 2, we plot the share of total plot value by plots of each
octile in Figure 3a, and the fraction of plots falling into different value classes in Figure 3b.
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We also plot the share of total plot value by plots of each octile for RLDP and non-RLDP
plots separately (see Figure 3c and 3d). Overall, the calibrated model matches reasonably
well the observed farm value-added, land value, and restriction distributions from the micro
dataset, given our choices of the model parameters.
Figure 2: Calibrated Model versus Data at Farm Level
(a) Share of Agricultural GDP (b) Share of Farms
6 Quantitative Analysis
We are now ready to describe our quantitative results. From the benchmark economy, we
conduct a set of counter-factual experiments to quantify the influence of RLDP on the
allocation of resources. First, we investigate the impacts of solely liberating restricted land.
Second, we perform sensitivity checks for several parameter values. Finally, we extend the
model to capture 3% of the restricted plots not complying with RLDP. Then, we ask what
happens to the aggregate outcomes if we force all farms to adhere to the policy.
6.1 Full Liberation and Main Results
The baseline experiment concerns the effects of entirely liberating RLDP. To do so, we simply
set δj = 0 ∀j ∈ J , then re-solve the model with the calibrated set of parameters. The results
of this experiment are summarized in Table 4. Here, we compare important statistics between
the restricted economy (first column) and the efficient economy (second column). Then, the
third column indicates the percentage changes as RLDP being lifted.
Before we start analyzing the results, it is important to note that all outputs in Table 4
are defined in terms of real GDP. Simply puts, all of the values are in 2003 US dollars, i.e.
evaluated at the benchmark prices. The nominal GDP can be computed using the new
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Figure 3: Calibrated Model versus Data at Plot Level
(a) Share of Total Plot Value (b) Share of Plots
(c) Share of Total RLDP Plot Value (d) Share of Total Non-RLDP Plot Value
set of prices, which can be important in welfare analysis. However, the main focus of the
paper is misallocation and productivity; thus, nominal GDP is not relevant. In addition, we
model farmers to be indifferent in crop choice leading to indeterminacy in labor allocation
of rice and non-rice activity. What matters is the share of the total stock of farmer ability
(
∫
i∈NAzidi) devoting to each crop production, which is regulated by the distribution of land
characteristics. Therefore, we only report results for labor allocation between agricultural
and non-agricultural sectors in Table 4. Furthermore, Vietnam is not a big country, nor
is it closed. Therefore, the price of goods might not be very sensitive to RLDP liberation
(as reported in Table 4). To this end, we explore the impacts of RLDP with output prices
being fixed instead of considering a closed economy. Table C1 of Appendix C shows that the
misallocation effects are slightly larger compared to those in the main analysis below.
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Agricultural Productivity - In the first row of Panel A in Table 4, we report the agricultural
total factor productivity TFPA. We find that eliminating RLDP raises the agricultural TFP
by 10.6%. Another important concern is farmer average productivity YA/NA. As shown
in the second row of Panel A, farmer productivity experiences an increase of 16.4% from
$632 per farmer to $736 per farmer (2003 USD). From equation (22), we decompose farmer
productivity into the following,
YA
NA
= TFPA
(
L
NA
)α
(33)
From this decomposition, the increase of 16.4% in farmer productivity is due to the increase
in agricultural TFP of 10.6% and an increase in average farm size of 15.5%. These two gains
together constitute the total gain in average farmer productivity through a multiplicative
effect. For a graphical comparison between the restricted and unrestricted economy, please
refer to Figure A1 in the Appendix A where the cumulative and density distributions of farm
value-added are plotted.
Channels of Reallocation - Next, we focus on the channels of resource reallocation leading
to the gain in productivity. The first channel, which we discussed in Proposition 2, is land
use reallocation. This channel alone contributes to the gain in TFP by 1.14-fold (this gain,
however, is offset by a factor of 0.97 from a reduction of average farmer ability). Such
improvement is a result of agricultural land being optimally used highlighted by 22% of land
being reallocated to the production of the other crops (see Panel C.2 and C.3). Consequently,
the total amount of rice reduces dramatically by 37.2% as shown Panel B.1. We will explore
this issue further at the end of this section.
The second channel, which is a combination of Proposition 3 and 4, is labor reallocation.
The effects of this channel can be decomposed into two sources. First, a reduction in the
total number of farmers raises the ratio of land to farmer. As reported in Panel D.1 and D.2,
approximately 7% of working population moves to the non-agricultural sector reducing labor
resource required to produce the agricultural goods. This switch also leads to an increase in
the average farm size of 15.5% accordingly (Panel C.1). Second, the average ability of those
moving out of agriculture is higher than the one of the remaining farmers, thus, reducing the
average farmer ability by 4.05% (Panel D.3). This downward shift of average ability creates
an offsetting effect lowering the gain in both farmer productivity and agricultural TFP.
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Table 4: The Effects of Liberating RLDP
Restricted Efficient Change (%)
(1) (2) (3)
(A) Productivity
1. Agricultural productivity TFPA 668 739 +10.6%
2. Farmer productivity YA/NA 632 736 +16.4%
3. Non-Ag. worker productivity pMYM/NM 2,824 2,582 -8.55%
4. GDP per capita (YA + pMYM )/N 1,664 1,736 +4.36%
(B) Real Output per Capita
1. Rice 32.1 20.1 -37.2%
2. Other crops 199 209 +4.77%
3. Non-agricultural good 5,436 5,720 +5.24%
(C) Land Allocation
1. Average farm size 0.86 0.99 +15.5%
2. Share of rice land 0.54 0.32 -40.7%
3. Share of non-rice land 0.46 0.68 +47.1%
(D) Labor Allocation
1. Share of farmers 0.53 0.46 -13.4%
2. Share of workers 0.47 0.54 +15.1%
3. Average farmer ability 3,176 3,047 -4.05%
4. Average worker ability 11,546 10,558 -8.55%
(E) Relative Prices
1. Non-rice crops to Rice 1.52 1.25 -17.7%
2. Non-agriculture goods to Rice 0.24 0.29 +16.8%
Notes: In Panel A, we denote by YA = pRYR + pOYO the agricultural GDP. All prices are evaluated at the
benchmark level in calculating productivity gain.
Other Productivity Measures - Reported in Panel A.3, labor productivity in the non-
agricultural sector decreases by 8.55%. From the discussion of Proposition 4, the reason is
that the average ability of those moving out of agriculture is lower than the average ability of
the existing workers. These individuals increase the number of workers by 15.1% (Panel D.2)
while driving down the average ability by 8.55%, thus, reducing the non-agricultural labor
productivity by an equal amount.
We are also interested in the economy-wide labor productivity. As shown in Panel A.4, we
find that eliminating RLDP raises the economy-wide labor productivity by 4.36%. This is
the combined effect of the changes in both agricultural and non-agricultural productivity. It
is worth noting that the value of economy-wide labor productivity, which is also real GDP
per working individual, is $1,664 at the benchmark level. This value is close to an average
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of $1,665 over 2005 - 2010 reported by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam. Although
this absolute value is not relevant to estimating the misallocation effects, it highlights the
appropriateness of our constructed data.
Remaining Statistics - Lifting RLDP reduces the total amount of rice dramatically by
37.2% while increasing the output of other crops and non-agricultural good by 4.77% and
5.24% respectively (Panel B). We cautiously note that the gain in productivity costs a
non-negligible loss in the total rice output. Since the novelty of RLDP is to ensure national
food sources, it is important to assess the matter of self-sufficiency in rice production. From
FAOSTAT database, we obtain a milled-equivalent total rice production of 29.4 million tons
and total rice consumption of 13.2 million tons as of 2013. A reduction of 37.2% in rice output
translates to a new total rice quantity of over 18.4 million tons (29.4× 0.628), which is still
well above the current level of consumption (13.2 mil. tons). Moreover, there is a declining
trend in rice consumption over the year because of the increases in per capita income. For
example, using household level survey, World Bank (2016) estimates that household rice
expenditure decreases more than 30% from 2002 through 2012. Therefore, these observations
together call for the need of liberating RLDP.
Overall, our baseline results suggest that eliminating RLDP leads to 10.6% increase in the
agricultural TFP. This improvement is highlighted by 16.4% gain in agricultural labor pro-
ductivity, 4.36% increase in economy-wide labor productivity, 13.4% reduction in agricultural
employment, and 15.5% increase in average farm size. An important question to ask is
whether these values together make sense. In a model calibrated to the U.S, Adamopoulos
and Restuccia (2014b) document that reducing economy-wide productivity to the poor
economy level increases the share of agricultural employment from 2.5% to 16.6%, decreases
average farm size by 8.6-fold, depresses agricultural labor productivity by 11.2-fold, and
generates a 7.6-fold reduction in aggregate labor productivity. Comparing to their results,
ours are much smaller in magnitude because we focus exclusively on a particular case of
resource misallocation. However, the pattern is the same regarding the channels through
which agricultural misallocation manifest itself.
6.2 Issue of Robustness
Three parameter values are either assigned or taken from outside the model: land income
share α, preference weight β, and elasticity of substitution across agricultural goods ζ. While
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our choices of values are consistent and somewhat conservative, it is still important to evaluate
the sensitivity of our quantitative results. We do so by varying the values of these parameters
and recalibrating the economy to the same targets as before. We report the results from
sensitivity checks in Table 5, where the first row presents some of the baseline results including:
(i) the gain in agricultural productivity [∆TFPA], (ii) the gain in GDP per capita [∆GDP ],
and (iii) the reduction in the total number of farmers [∆ Farmer].
Thus far, we have chosen the land elasticity value of α = 0.35. Now, we change the value
of α to 0.3 and 0.4. As shown in the discussion of equation (24), the misallocation effects
of RLDP is larger as land becomes more important, and vice versa. Indeed, the gain in
agricultural TFP reduces to 9.15% when α = 0.3, and increases to 12.2% when α = 0.4.
While the productivity gains change very little, we observe that the reduction in farmer share
increases greatly in magnitude from -13.4% to -16.2% as we raise α to 0.4. This suggests
that the channel of labor reallocation is quite sensitive. Since we set a conservative value of
α, it is unlikely that the misallocation effects are overestimated in our main results.
Table 5: Results for Alternative Parameter Values
∆TFPA ∆GDP ∆ Farmers
(1) (2) (3)
Main Results +10.6% +4.36% -13.4%
Alternatives
α = 0.3 +9.15% +3.62% -11.0%
α = 0.4 +12.2% +5.12% -16.2%
β ≈ 0 +10.6% +4.41% -13.9%
β = 0.01 +10.9% +4.19% -12.1%
ζ = 1.5 +8.95% +3.74% -11.5%
ζ = 3.5 +11.3% +4.59% -14.3%
In the benchmark economy, our value of β = 0.002 is calibrated to the long-run employment
share in agriculture of 5%. However, previous studies have assumed targets that are close or
equal to zero, such as the works of Gollin et al. (2002, 2007) and Restuccia et al. (2008).
Therefore, we want to examine how our gains response as β being moved close to zero or
raised to 0.01. Note that a lower value of β means a higher level of subsistence requirement,
thus, suggesting a more responsive employment share (see equation (25) and its associated
discussion). Consistent with the prediction, we find that the misallocation effects are slightly
enlarged as we move β toward zero, and slightly reduced as β = 0.01. However, these
fluctuations are insignificant in magnitude.
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For the elasticity of substitution across agricultural goods, we have set ζ = 2.63 as a midpoint
between values documented in prior studies. Here, we allow ζ to take a value of 1.5 and 3.5
for our sensitivity checks. This range of value is much broader than the range suggested by
previous studies. However, we prefer a more extensive range because the preference for rice
is declining rapidly, e.g. a reduction of 32% in rice share of household food expenditure over
the period of 2002 - 2012 (World Bank 2016). In either case, we still observe substantial
misallocation effects that are not much different from the primary results.
6.3 Issue of Compliance
As the Law on Land has become more and more refined over time, enforcing farmers upon
following the“vision” is also an essential objective of the State. Therefore, the next experiment
concerns the quantitative influence of law enforcement. We do so by introducing to our model
a hypothetical cost cf of violating the policy. Particularly, we assume that a farmer can pay
a fee equaling to cf , so that he/she can use a restricted plot j for non-rice crop production.
Thus, conditional on being subject to RLDP, the price of a restricted plot j is given by,
max
{
qReRj, qOeOj − cf
}
, ∀j ∈ J and δj = 1 (34)
The derivation is analogous to the discussion of equation (12). Intuitively, if a farmer wants
to use a restricted plot j to produce non-rice crops, he/she has to pay an extra fee of cf . The
expenditure for this plot is given by qOeOj + cf . Consequently, the maximum price the farmer
is willing to pay for that plot is qOeOj − cf . Therefore, conditional on being restricted, plot j
will deviate if the inequality qOeOj − cf > qReRj satisfies.
Next, we are required to have some sense of the degree of enforcement. Using VARHS at the
plot-level, we determine the compliance status by comparing plots’ restricted status to their
cultivated crop. A restricted plot that does not produce rice is considered as a non-compliant
plot. According to this simple mapping, there are approximately 3% of the restricted plots,
around 1.3% of the total plots, does not comply with RLDP in the micro-data. We recognize
that farmers may inaccurately report which crops are actually cultivated on their plots.
However, this statistic represents the best estimate of the RLDP compliance rate that is
available to us. Nevertheless, we cautiously note that the results here can be driven by
measurement errors or the method of defining compliance. Therefore, we do not wish to
incorporate the compliance issue of this section into our main analysis.
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Table 6: The Effects of Strengthening Law Enforcement
3% Deviation 0% Deviation Change (%)
(1) (2) (3)
Agriculture Productivity TFPA 693 668 -3.61%
GDP per capita 1,694 1,664 -1.77%
Share of farmers 0.50 0.53 +5.99%
According to the setup in equation (34), the top 3% of the restricted plots, in terms of
[qOeOj − qReRj], will deviate. We proceed to set the restriction status δj = 0 for these plots
and reproduce the model.19 Then, we compare an economy where the deviation rate is 3% to
the benchmark economy where all plots comply. We report some important statistics from
this exercise in Table 6. Our results indicate that policy deviations may promote allocative
efficiency. Notably, moving to the deviation-free environment where all farms comply with
the policy reduce agricultural productivity by 3.61% and GDP per capita by 1.77%. It also
results in 5.99% increase in the total number of farmers.
7 Conclusion
Our primary objective is to answer a question of why less-developed countries devote a
significant share of labor to agriculture despite its low productivity. To do so, we connect
the misallocation and the institution-growth literature by investigating the distortionary
consequences of a specific type of land institution. In particular, we study the impacts of
Vietnam’s Rice Land Designation Policy on resource allocation and productivity. Within
a quantitative two-sector model, we quantify the effects using micro-geographical data and
household survey over the period 2002 - 2012. In the theoretical framework, the restrictions
on farmland not only lower agricultural productivity but also prevent a share of labor from
moving out of agriculture.
The main counter-factual experiment suggests that eliminating all land use restrictions leads
to 10.6% gain in agricultural total factor productivity (TFP). This improvement is highlighted
by 16.4% gain in agricultural labor productivity, 4.36% increase in real GDP per capita,
13.4% reduction in agricultural employment, and 15.5% increase in average farm size. From
a series of sensitivity checks, we find that our main results are unlikely to be driven by the
19 Alternatively, we can calibrate the fixed cost cf so that the model reproduces the estimated compliance
rate. Then, we simply raise the fixed cost to the point where all farms comply with the policy. The results
reported in Table 6 are unchanged regardless of the approach we take.
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choices of parameter values. We further explore the channel in which policy deviations may
promote allocative efficiency. In particular, moving to the deviation-free environment where
all farms comply with the policy results in a decrease of 3.61% in agricultural TFP and 1.77%
in GDP per capita. It also leads to an increase of 5.99% in the number of farmers.
While misallocation in agriculture has been studied extensively, our research highlights a
novel source of misallocation that is prevalent in other countries such as China, Myanmar,
Uzbekistan, among others. Nevertheless, we cautiously note that the gain in productivity
costs a non-negligible loss in the total rice output. The novelty of RLDP is to ensure national
food security to cope with unexpected circumstances. Indeed, rice has been the primary
subsidy for people living below the national poverty line and those experiencing natural
disasters. Therefore, making appropriate adjustments regarding RLDP may require both
economic and political assessments.
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Appendix A
Figure A1: Farm Value-Added: Restricted vs. Unrestricted
(a) Distribution of Farms and Value-Added
(b) Distribution of Farms and Value-Added (log scale)
(c) Density Distribution of Farms and Value-Added (log scale)
Appendix B
In this Appendix, we show that our model is unaffected by: (i) subsidies given to rice growers
(as discussed in Section 2.2), and (ii) the inclusion of sectoral technology. We consider a
more extensive version of the model. Rice farmers receive subsidies in both output and input
markets, denoted by (1 + τ yR) and (1− τ lR) respectively. Meanwhile, farmers of the other crops
are subject to both output and input taxes, denoted by (1− τ yO) and (1 + τ lO) respectively.
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Besides, there exists a crop-specific technology in producing rice (AR) and non-rice (AO).
Farmer i profit maximization problems are given by,
piR(zi) = max
ER
{
(1 + τ yR)p˜RκARz
1−α
i E
α
Ri − (1− τ lR)qRERi
}
piO(zi) = max
EO
{
(1− τ yO)p˜OκAOz1−αi EαOi − (1 + τ lO)qOEOi
} (B1)
where p˜R and p˜O are the actual price of rice and non-rice respectively. The model price of rice
and non-rice {pR, pO} can be expressed as pR = (1+τ
y
R)p˜RAR
(1−τ lR)α
and pO =
(1−τyO)p˜OAO
(1+τ lO)
α . Therefore,
we can rewrite the profit maximization problems in (B1) as follows,
piR(zi) = max
ER
{
pRκz
1−α
i E
α
Ri − qRERi
}
piO(zi) = max
EO
{
pOκz
1−α
i E
α
Oi − qOEOi
} (B2)
The sets of maximization problems in (B1) and (B2) yield the same set of solutions, given by,
piR(zi) = zi
(
[(1 + τ yR)p˜RAR]
1/α
(1− τ lR)qR
) α
1−α
= zi
(
p
1/α
R
qR
) α
1−α
piO(zi) = zi
(
[(1− τ yO)p˜OAO]1/α
(1 + τ lO)qO
) α
1−α
= zi
(
p
1/α
O
qO
) α
1−α
(B3)
In our main model, both crop choice and occupational choice are governed by the relative
price pR/pO (see Section 3.3 and 3.4). The relative price between rice and non-rice crop can
be expressed as,
pR
pO
=
p˜R
p˜O
[
AR
AO
(
1 + τ yR
1− τ yO
)(
1 + τ lO
1− τ lR
)α]
=
p˜R
p˜O
Ω (B4)
where Ω is the value inside the square brackets. The experiments conducted in our study con-
cerns only removing RLDP. In other words, the values of the parameters {AR, AO, τ yR, τ lR, τ yO, τ lO}
do not change; thus, Ω is constant. Any change in the relative price pR/pO reflects the change
in the actual relative price p˜R/p˜O. The same logic applies for the non-agriculture sector.
Thus, our results are unaffected by other taxes/subsidies and sectoral technologies.
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Table C1: The Effects of Liberating RLDP as Prices Being Fixed
Restricted Efficient Change (%)
(1) (2) (3)
(A) Productivity
1. Agricultural productivity TFPA 668 740 +10.9%
2. Farmer productivity YA/NA 632 741 +17.2%
3. Non-Ag. worker productivity pMYM/NM 2,824 2,559 -9.30%
4. GDP per capita (YA + pMYM )/N 1,664 1,739 +4.56%
(B) Real Output per Capita
1. Rice 32.1 8.30 -74.1%
2. Other crops 199 214 +7.83%
3. Non-agricultural good 5,436 5,747 +5.73%
(C) Land Allocation
1. Average farm size 0.86 1.00 +17.2%
2. Share of rice land 0.54 0.19 -65.4%
3. Share of non-rice land 0.46 0.81 +75.6%
(D) Labor Allocation
1. Share of farmers 0.53 0.45 -14.7%
2. Share of workers 0.47 0.55 +16.6%
3. Average farmer ability 3,176 3,036 -4.42%
4. Average worker ability 11,546 10,472 -9.30%
(E) Relative Prices
1. Non-rice crops to Rice 1.52 1.52 0%
2. Non-agriculture goods to Rice 0.24 0.24 0%
Notes: In Panel A, we denote by YA = pRYR + pOYO the agricultural GDP. As opposed to the main analysis
(closed economy), all output prices are fixed in calculating productivity gain here. Overall, the misallocation
effects are slightly larger without the offsetting effects caused by changes in prices.
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